Response bases of classification 3 Beyond Dissociation Logic:
Evidence for Controlled and Automatic Influences in Artificial Grammar Learning
The study of various types of unconscious influence on behavior is one of the most hotly debated and widely researched topics in psychology. Traditionally, Freudian psychologists have assumed that unconscious influences stem from repressed sexual and aggressive urges and fantasies. In contrast, modern researchers in cognitive psychology assume that unconscious influences are broader and not necessarily linked to repression. For example, people might treat a mundane, previously encountered stimulus differently from a novel one, despite the fact that they do not consciously recall having encountered it before (e.g., they may claim to like an old stimulus more than the novel one, Zajonc, 1968) . However, despite these differences in the underlying assumptions about the nature of unconscious influences, both the "hot" and "cold" camps share a fascination with discovering those situations where unconscious influences occur and a great deal of research has been dedicated to this objective.
Even within cognitive psychology, interest in unconscious influences takes many forms, spanning several different areas of research including perception (e.g., blindsight, Weiskrantz, 1986 ; subliminal perception, Cheesman & Merikle, 1984; Marcel, 1983) , implicit memory (e.g., Jacoby, 1991; Schacter, 1987; Roediger & McDermott, 1993) and implicit learning (e.g., Reber, 1989 Reber, , 1993 . Although the debates over the role of unconscious influences in the different areas of cognitive psychology share many similarities, research on unconscious influences in perception and memory has advanced in a different direction from research on unconscious influences in learning.
The difference in direction between the perception and memory fields on the one hand and learning on the other is exemplified by the nature of the debates in the different fields. The debate in the implicit learning field has focussed mostly on whether or not a particular experimental result meets the criteria necessary to claim that participants were really unconsciously influenced by what they learned (e.g., see Shanks and St. John's, 1994, recent review) . However, research in the perception and memory fields has recently been focussed more on developing research strategies and techniques to study unconscious influences in a Response bases of classification 4 way that is less likely to reproduce the typical objections about meeting particular stringent criteria of unawareness. These techniques include setting up experimental circumstances in which conscious and unconscious influences are set in opposition so that their relative influence can be determined (e.g., Jacoby, Woloshyn & Kelley, 1989; Jacoby, 1991) , and finding converging evidence of the qualitative distinction between conscious and unconscious influences (e.g., Reingold & Merikle, 1993) . In both cases, there is a starting assumption that both conscious and unconscious influences on performance exist. The emphasis, therefore, is less on finding evidence of unconscious influences that meets particular stringent criteria, as it has been in the implicit learning literature (for the most recent round, see Dienes & Berry, 1997a , 1997b Neal & Hesketh, 1997a , 1997b Perruchet, Vinter & Gallego, 1997; Reber, 1997; Stadler, 1997; Whittlesea & Dorken, 1997) , but rather on determining the relative contribution of conscious and unconscious influences to performance on an experimental task. Merikle (1994;  see also Reingold and Merikle, 1993) stated in the open peer commentary on Shanks and St. John's (1994) recent review of implicit learning research, that a "better strategy than attempting to 'prove' or 'disprove' the existence of learning without awareness is to assume that both conscious and unconscious influences exist and then to develop experimental techniques that can distinguish between these two types of influence. To date, however, this research strategy has not been adopted to any great extent in studies directed at demonstrating implicit or unconscious learning" (p. 412). We agree wholeheartedly with Merikle's claim and we have attempted to adopt the research strategy he suggested. By doing so, we hope to develop both cross-talk between the implicit learning field and other fields where unconscious influences are investigated and to make a modest contribution toward broadening the debate over unconscious influences within the field of implicit learning itself.
Two questions have been central to the debate on unconscious influences in learning:
(1) can people learn the structure of their environment without conscious intent to learn, and if so, how does this mode of learning compare to intentional learning and (2) if people do acquire knowledge about their environment unintentionally, is this knowledge explicit? Regarding the second question, there seems to be something right about the idea that people develop Response bases of classification 5 sensitivity to structural regularities without the concomitant ability to verbalize the nature of that structure. Indeed, we and others have suggested that such tacit sensitivity is probably quite ubiquitous (e.g., Brooks, Vokey & Higham, 1997; Reber, 1989; Vokey & Brooks, 1992) . However, whether or not tacit sensitivity represents unconscious sensitivity is another question altogether. It is quite possible, for example, that participants simply have difficulty articulating the knowledge they relied on to demonstrate learning within the experiment. Such knowledge is, by definition, tacit, but is it unconscious? Elsewhere, we have sidestepped this debate by emphasizing the psychological importance of tacit learning in its own right, regardless of whether such learning meets the necessary criteria to be regarded as unconscious (see . In contrast, in this paper, we tackle the issue of unconscious learning directly. However, we have chosen not to contribute to the debate by attempting to ascertain once and for all whether or not unconscious learning exists. In our opinion, the question of whether or not unconscious learning exists will never be answered conclusively using the current methods most popular with implicit learning theorists.
Dissociation Logic
One reason that we believe attempts at proving or disproving unconscious learning will ultimately fail is that nearly all such research is based on dissociation logic. With this logic, participants are exposed to a structured set of stimuli and later are given two tests. The first, a test of awareness (e.g., a post-experimental questionnaire), indicates that there is little or no awareness of the structure. On the other hand, performance on a second, indirect test of learning (e.g., classification of new items according to the structure), indicates that the person learned more about the structure than suggested by the test of awareness. For this logic to work, several criteria must be met. First, each test must be exclusive; that is, the test of consciousness must not be influenced by unconscious knowledge and the indirect test must not be affected by conscious knowledge (Reingold & Merikle, 1988; Neal & Hesketh, 1997a) .
Second, performance on the test of awareness must not be influenced by conscious knowledge that is correlated with the conscious knowledge being measured, and which could lead to enhanced performance on the indirect test (Shanks & St. John's, 1994, information criterion) .
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Third, the test of awareness must be sensitive enough to detect all awareness that may lead to above chance performance on the indirect test (Shanks & St. John's, 1994 , sensitivity criterion).
Considerable debate has surrounded dissociation logic and whether or not research based on it has met all the criteria above. To illustrate, consider artificial grammar learning, the most extensively researched of all the implicit learning paradigms (e.g., Reber, 1967 Reber, , 1989 . In these experiments, participants are exposed to strings of symbols (typically consonants) that conform to a finite state grammar. After the training phase, participants are informed that a complex rule structure was used to generate the training stimuli, but they are not informed of its nature. Subsequent classification tests suggest that participants are sensitive to this structure.
For example, they demonstrate a grammaticality effect in that they can discriminate novel strings that conform to the grammar (grammatical) from strings that do not (nongrammatical).
However, tests of awareness have indicated that the rules of the grammar are not available to consciousness (e.g., see Reber, 1989 Reber, , 1993 . The finding that tests of awareness underestimate learning as indicated by performance on the classification test has been marshalled in many studies as evidence that at least some of what is learned in these experiments is unconscious or implicit (e.g., Knowlton, Ramus & Squire, 1992; Reber, 1967 Reber, , 1989 Reber & Lewis, 1977; Reber, Allen & Regan, 1985) .
For the claim of unconscious learning to be valid, critics have claimed that the necessary criteria must be met. For example, consider verbal report on a post-experimental questionnaire, one common test of awareness in this paradigm. It might be suggested that this test does not meet the sensitivity criterion outlined above because participants may not be able to communicate effectively the conscious knowledge that they possess or the interview may not be extensive enough. Alternatively, consider the classification task, an indirect test of learning.
Several investigators have demonstrated that performance in artificial grammar experiments can be predicted by what is allegedly conscious knowledge about string fragments or "chunks" (e.g., Dulany, Carlson & Dewey, 1984) . For example, Perruchet & Pacteau (1990) demonstrated that participants using simple, explicit knowledge of bigrams that occurred frequently in the training strings performed virtually indistinguishably from participants Response bases of classification 7 performing classification in artificial grammar experiments. However, if the test of awareness only probes for conscious knowledge of the rules of the grammar, some could argue that it fails to meet the information criterion. Finally, Reber et al. (1985) suggested that tests of conscious awareness may be influenced by unconscious knowledge such that they fail to meet the exclusivity assumption. Therefore, these researchers maintained, even when people seem to be indicating conscious awareness of the underlying structure, (e.g., by accurately underlining the parts of strings that make them nongrammatical, Dulany et al., 1984) , their performance may actually be driven by unconscious knowledge.
The problems associated with meeting the criteria needed for dissociation logic to work may be quite broad and generalize beyond artificial grammar experiments. First, for the tests to be exclusive, it is necessary to make a process purity assumption whereby performance on a task or test is assumed to reflect only a single underlying process or type of influence. This assumption is probably not feasible for most tasks (e.g., see Jacoby, 1991; Jacoby, Toth & Yonelinas, 1993; Toth, Reingold & Jacoby, 1994) . Second, to meet the sensitivity criterion, it is necessary to demonstrate that the direct test has measured all conscious knowledge that could lead to above chance performance on the indirect test. The problem is that, no matter how extensive the test of awareness, it is always possible that a further step could have been taken which would have revealed the participants' "true" state of awareness. Thus, critics of unconscious learning have always been in a position to argue that had that further step been taken, enough conscious knowledge would have been revealed to account for performance on the indirect test. These kinds of problems will always be apparent whenever a research strategy is aimed at proving that conscious knowledge underestimates performance on some task and it reflects a fundamental problem associated with dissociation logic (see Merikle, 1994 for similar observations).
The Logic of Opposition: An Alternative One way to escape the problems inherent in dissociation logic is to adopt the logic of opposition (e.g., Jacoby, 1991; . This logic has allowed researchers to separate the contributions of conscious and unconscious influences in a variety of tasks, but Response bases of classification 8 mostly it has been applied to investigations of implicit memory (e.g., Jacoby, 1991 To illustrate opposition logic, consider an experiment by Jacoby (1991, Experiment 3) that addressed conscious and unconscious influences of memory. In the first phase of the experiment, participants were given a mixed list of words to read and anagrams to solve (e.g., yodrw to make dowry). In the second phase, another list of words was presented aurally to participants. Finally, participants were administered a recognition memory test in Phase 3. In the in concert condition, participants were told to rate a word "old" during the recognition memory test if it was presented in any form earlier in the experiment (i.e., either as a word to read, as an anagram to solve or as a word presented aurally). However, in the opposition condition, participants were instructed to rate only earlier heard words as "old" and to avoid rating any words "old" that were either read or solved as anagrams in Phase 1. Participants in both the in concert and opposition conditions performed the recognition task quite well for words presented as anagrams; P(old) was .80 in the in concert condition and .29 in the opposition condition (where 1.0 and 0.0 would have reflected perfect performance in these two conditions, respectively). However, compared to performance with words presented as anagrams, performance for previously read words was less impressive; P(old) decreased from .80 to .48 in the in concert condition and increased from .29 to .37 in the opposition condition.
These results suggest that participants were able to determine the source of memories for words solved as anagrams better than for read words. Jacoby (1991) suggested that this difference in source discrimination was due to more conscious recollection for words presented as anagrams than for words previously read, allowing participants to better control the memory influence of words presented as anagrams. Note that the extent to which participants were able Response bases of classification 9 to determine the source of memory, and thus control the influence of memory, is reflected in the difference between the in concert (where perfect source discrimination=1.0) and opposition conditions (where perfect source discrimination=0.0). In Jacoby's experiment, this difference was .51 for words previously solved as anagrams but only .11 for previously read words.
In addition to the source-specific memory influence of conscious recollection, Jacoby (1991) also found evidence for the source-nonspecific memory influence of familiarity.
Evidence for familiarity is derived from the opposition condition. In this condition, the two memory influences are set in opposition to each other; conscious recollection decreases P(old), but familiarity increases P(old). Thus, in the opposition condition, if P(old) for a class of previously presented items is greater than P(old) for new items (the false alarm rate or baseline), then the difference must be due to a source-nonspecific memory influence (familiarity) and not conscious recollection. For example, in Jacoby's Experiment 3, P(old) for previously read words was higher (.37) than the the baseline of P(old) for new words (.22). This difference was opposite to what was expected had the read words been consciously recollected and reflects an influence on performance that was counter to participants' intentions. Because familiarity acted counter to participants' intentions, it is described as an automatic or unconscious influence. Following Jacoby's lead, and similar characterizations in many other papers that have used opposition logic (e.g., Jacoby et al., 1993; Toth et al., 1994) , we will use the in concert-opposition difference as a measure of controlled or conscious influences and the opposition-baseline difference as a measure of automatic or unconscious influences. Below, we describe how we have set up in concert and opposition conditions in an artificial grammar learning paradigm. Jacoby (1991) and colleagues (e.g., Jacoby et al., 1993) have taken the opposition logic further. By making some assumptions about statistical relationship between controlled and uncontrolled influences on behaviour, they developed the process dissociation procedure. With this procedure, it is assumed that controlled and automatic influences are statistically independent, which allows quantitative estimates of controlled and automatic influences to be derived. The estimate for controlled or conscious influences (C) is the difference in response
Response bases of classification 10 rates between the in concert (inclusion) and opposition (exclusion) conditions. Additionally, because the influences are assumed to be independent, Jacoby's estimate of automatic or unconscious influence (U) is the opposition (exclusion) rate divided by the rate that conscious recollection was absent (i.e., U=Opposition/[1-C]). Recently, however, the assumption of independence underlying the process dissociation procedure has been a source of a great deal of debate (e.g., see Curran & Hintzman, 1995; Graf & Komatsu, 1994; Hintzman & Curran, 1997; Jacoby, Begg & Toth, 1997; Jacoby & Shrout, 1997; Jacoby, Toth, Yonelinas & Debner, 1994; Jacoby, Yonelinas & Jennings, 1997; Joordens & Merikle, 1993; Toth, Reingold & Jacoby, 1995) . Consequently, although we find the process dissociation procedure a potentially valuable approach for estimating the contribution of conscious and unconscious influences to a task, we have chosen instead to directly compare the particular experimental conditions underlying opposition logic to avoid the assumptions necessary to apply the process dissociation procedure or any of its variants.
Overview of the Experiments
One reason that research on implicit learning has mostly been limited to dissociation logic has to do with the experimental design that has typically been used in this domain. With few exceptions, (e.g., Brooks, 1978; Dienes, Altmann, Kwan & Goode, 1995; Whittlesea & Dorken, 1993) , research on artificial grammar learning has been limited to the learning of strings generated by a single structure. Although these single structure designs may have some advantages (e.g., they allow for direct comparison to yes/no recognition experiments; see Higham, 1997a Higham, , 1997b Whittlesea & Dorken, 1993; Vokey & Brooks, 1992) , they are problematic in terms of determining implicit and explicit contributions to classification performance because both influences are necessarily confounded. That is, a response of "grammatical" during the classification test could be due to implicit influences, explicit influences or both. With only a single structure, it is difficult to separate implicit and explicit contributions to task performance without comparing performance across tasks.
2 Thus, to adapt the logic of opposition to an implicit learning paradigm, we had participants learn strings generated from two grammars. Opposition was created in Experiment
Response bases of classification 11 1 by requiring participants to reject strings from one grammar, but accept strings from the second. Performance on the to-be-excluded items was then compared to baseline acceptance rates (i.e., "grammatical" response rate to nongrammatical items) and to performance on a task where the influences were set in concert by requiring participants to accept strings from both grammars. The former comparison allowed us to determine whether or not there were influences on classification performance that were not directly under the participants' control (i.e., automatic influences). The latter comparison allowed us to investigate controllable influences on performance. In Experiment 2, these opposition and in concert conditions were derived from a source monitoring test as explained below. Because we were able to isolate the contributions of controllable and automatic influences, we were also able to determine the effect of experimental manipulations on these influences. In particular, we compared (a) performance under standard testing conditions to performance with a response deadline in Experiment 1, and (b) performance on an immediate test to performance after a 12 day retention interval in Experiment 2.
Experiment 1
Method
Participants. Fifty-one psychology undergraduate students participated in the experiment. One participant failed to finish the test booklet, a second was inadvertently provided with the wrong test booklet pages and a third was eliminated at random to equate the sample sizes, leaving 48 participants for the analysis. Twenty-four were assigned to the in concert condition and 24 to the opposition condition.
Stimulus and Materials. Two different finite state grammars were used to generate the training and test materials. Grammar A (GA) was taken from Vokey and Brooks (1992) and Grammar B (GB) was created by altering particular letters and arrows within Vokey and Brooks' structure. Both structures are shown in Figure 1 . Grammatical letter strings were generated from each grammar by entering in at the left hand side and moving between nodes along arrows until exiting on the right hand side. As transitions are made between nodes, letters are acquired that formed grammatical letter strings. To ensure that the strings from each grammar
Response bases of classification 12 were comparable, we ensured that they (a) were comprised of the same set of letters (X, M, R, V, and T), (b) were approximately the same length (3 to 7 letters), (c) started with the same set of legal bigrams (MV, MX, VM, and VX) and (d) never contained more than one repetition of any letter. Nongrammatical strings were also all 3 to 7 letters in length and were composed of the same letter set as the grammatical items. However, all nongrammatical strings violated the rule structure because they could not be generated by legal transitions through either grammar. Within both the in concert and opposition groups, half the participants rated the first 34 items (pages 1 and 2) under standard testing conditions, and the second 34 items (pages 3 and 4) under deadline conditions, whereas the other half of the participants performed these tasks
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standard/deadline) mixed design with condition manipulated between-subjects and test type manipulated within-subjects.
Procedure. Participants were trained in groups. The experimenter revealed a pair of strings, one from GA and the other from GB, for approximately five seconds and then covered them up. Participants were asked to memorize the two strings while they were in view and to write them on a sheet of paper in appropriate columns labelled "List A" and "List B" once they were no longer visible. Once all subjects had written down the two strings, two new strings, plus any other strings previously memorized, were made visible, and the procedure was repeated until all 32 training items were viewed. After all the strings from the first transparency were learned in this manner, participants were asked to turn their piece of paper over and the training procedure was repeated using strings from the second transparency. Because the strings in each column were printed in a different random order on the second slide, the pairs presented for study were different between the two passes though the training sequence.
After completing the training phase, each participant was provided with a test booklet.
Each test booklet consisted of (a) a page of instructions (b) two pages of strings (34) to rate (c) a second, different page of instructions and (d) two new pages of strings (34) to rate. All sets of instructions informed participants that there were two different rule structures used to generate items from the two studied lists, but they did not provide any detail regarding the nature of these structures. Instead, participants receiving in concert instructions were asked to rate any test items believed to be consistent with either GA or GB as "grammatical" by writing a "G" in the space provided next to each test item, and any items inconsistent with both structures as "nongrammatical" by writing NG next to the string. Participants in the opposition condition were instructed to rate only GB items as "grammatical" and to rate GA and NG items as "nongrammatical."
In addition to receiving either in concert or opposition instructions, each participant also received both standard and deadline instructions. Deadline instructions indicated that responses to each item would be timed by the experimenter such that only 1 s per item was
Response bases of classification 14 permitted. This deadline was imposed vocally by the experimenter who counted from 1 to 34 during the deadline test phase, incrementing at a rate of 1 value per second. The test items were numbered from 1 to 34. Participants were asked to use these numbers to synchronize their rating speed with the experimenter's vocal count. Standard rating instructions (which either preceded or followed the deadline instructions depending on the counterbalance condition) were enforced by simply omitting the instructions specific to the response deadline.
All other aspects of the standard instructions were the same as for the deadline condition.
Participants within a group being tested at a given time were all from only one counterbalance condition (i.e., all participants were either given deadline instructions first or standard instructions first). The experimenter read aloud the first set of instructions as the participants followed along. Participants were asked to stop after they had rated the first two pages of strings to allow the second set of instructions be read in a similar manner. This procedure was implemented to ensure that all participants fully understood the instructions and so that they were all at the same stage of the test phase.
Results and Discussion
The mean proportions for GA, GB and NG items rated "grammatical" in the in concertstandard, in concert-deadline, opposition-standard and opposition-deadline conditions are shown in Table 1 . Preliminary analyses indicated that the endorsement rates for old and new grammatical items were very similar, so data from both item types were pooled. For the reader's convenience, the relevant in concert, opposition and baseline values are shown in Table 2 . Two main analyses were completed on the data summarized in Table 2 . The first analysis compared the effect of imposing a response deadline on the acceptance rate of GA items in the in concert and opposition conditions to determine the extent to which participants could control their responding in the task. Alpha level of .05 was adopted for all analyses reported in this paper. A 2 (test type: standard/deadline) X 2 (condition: in concert/opposition) suggest that participants were able to control their learning by specifically rejecting items generated from grammar A, but that this ability was impaired in the deadline testing condition relative to the standard testing condition.
The second analysis determined whether there was any evidence for automatic responding by comparing the acceptance rate of GA items to the baseline acceptance rate of NG items for the 24 participants in the opposition condition. A 2 (test type: deadline/standard) X 2 (item type: GA-opposition/NG-opposition) within-subjects ANOVA indicated that GA items were accepted with greater frequency (.51) than NG items (.39), F(1,23)=9.38, MSE=.037, and also that the acceptance rate was greater in the deadline condition (.47) than in the standard condition (.42), F(1,23)=5.43, MSE=.010. The former main-effect provides evidence for an automatic influence in this classification task. However, in contrast to the controlled effect, the automatic effect was not affected by imposing a deadline at test, F(1,23)<1; that is, despite attempts to avoid endorsing GA items, participants were still more likely to accept these items than NG items, and this tendency remained invariant across the standard and deadline testing conditions. Turner and Fischler (1993) also used a response deadline procedure in an artificial grammar learning experiment and found that, under deadline conditions, participants who had been instructed to memorize the training strings performed better than participants instructed to search for the underlying rule structure. However, when more time was provided to respond, the two groups did not differ. Turner and Fischler argued that this was evidence for two distinct learning modes. In contrast, our results suggest a distinction between two types of influence (automatic versus controlled) on responding. Participants were able to specifically reject GA items, but this ability was impaired by imposing a response deadline at test. However, participants were not able to control (discount) fully the influence of having learned GA items; the acceptance rate to these items in the opposition condition remained greater than the Response bases of classification 16 acceptance rate to NG items and this automatic effect of learning GA items was not affected by imposing a response deadline at test (see Table 2 ).
Experiment 2
The main goal of Experiment 2 was to replicate conceptually the results of Experiment 1 using an improved experimental methodology. One problem with Experiment 1 was that the in concert and opposition conditions were created directly, with instructions requiring that participants accept a class of items in one case, but reject it in another. In the process dissociation literature, several researchers have argued that creating these conditions with instructions could lead to bias shifts and a great deal of recent attention has been directed at addressing these problems (e.g., see Buchner, Erdfelder & Vaterrodt-Plünnecke, 1995; Donaldson, 1996; Yonelinas & Jacoby, 1996; Yonelinas, Regehr & Jacoby, 1995; Jacoby et al., 1993) . Generally speaking, because participants in the opposition condition are required to reject more items than participants in the in concert condition, it follows that opposition participants would adopt a more conservative response criterion than in concert participants.
This difference in bias could be problematic because the in concert and opposition rates, used to estimate controlled and automatic responding, correspond to hit rates in signal detection terms (i.e., the proportion of GA items accepted in each case). Consequently, any shift in bias is likely to have direct, but different, effects on the in concert and opposition rates, and these different effects are likely to be non-linearly related (see Green & Swets, 1966) .
A second problem had to do with limited generality of the results. That is, we did not counterbalance the list of items that was to be rejected in the opposition condition in Experiment 1; all participants in the opposition were required to reject GA items only, never GB items.
Although this does not undermine the main conclusions of Experiment 1, the generality of the results would be greater if the design were more symmetrical so that the in concert, opposition and baseline conditions were derived from both GA and GB items.
To alleviate these problems, in Experiment 2 we derived the in concert and opposition
conditions from the response rates in the various categories of a source monitoring test. By deriving the conditions from particular response/item combinations (as shown below), it was no longer necessary to provide participants with different sets of instructions that could have potentially produced changes in bias. Additionally, the in concert and opposition conditions were derived by collapsing across both GA and GB items.
The source monitoring test in Experiment 2 consisted of four response alternatives for each test item: (1) "A" for belonging to GA, (2) "B" for belonging to GB, (3) "NC" for not consistent with either GA or GB, and (4) "K" for belonging to either GA or GB (i.e., "know").
This last response category was designed to limit wild guessing in the "A" and "B" response categories and was meant to be analogous to the "know" category in the remember/know literature (e.g., Tulving, 1985) . To derive the in concert condition, we averaged the assignment rate of (a) GA items to the "A" response category and (b) GB items to the "B" response category. Both of these rates could be affected by either controllable or automatic influences as both types of influence work in concert, increasing the likelihood that the appropriate response category will be chosen. Conversely, to derive the opposition condition we averaged the assignment rate of (a) GA items to the "B" response category and (b) GB items to the "A" response category. In comparison to the rates used to derive the in concert condition, these rates cannot be affected by a controllable learning influence; if the person was able to control the influence, then a correct assignment would have been made (GA item to "A" and GB item to "B"). However, these rates are still potentially affected by automatic influences. Hence, in cases where there is an incorrect assignment of a grammatical item to the wrong grammatical category, controlled and automatic influences are set in opposition to each other. As in Experiment 1, having derived the in concert and opposition conditions, we estimated the degree to which participants were able to control the influence of having been exposed to grammatical items by comparing the in concert and opposition conditions. Conversely, by comparing the opposition condition to baseline response rates (i.e., the average assignment rate of NG items to the "A" and "B" response categories), we estimated the role of automatic influences on test performance.
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To investigate further whether controlled and automatic influences could be dissociated by certain experimental manipulations, we varied the retention interval between training and test Design and Materials. The materials used in the training and test phases were the same as in Experiment 1. As before, the training strings were displayed to participants with transparencies on an overhead projector. For each participant, two test booklets were assembled, both of which were inserted into a large envelope. One booklet within each envelope was white and the other was green. The white booklet was completed by all participants immediately after training and the green booklet was completed 12 days later. Both booklets consisted of a cover page of instructions and two pages of strings to rate. The four pages of strings used in the booklets were the same as those used in Experiment 1. However, the order of the four pages was counterbalanced in this experiment (unlike Experiment 1 where the order was fixed). The counterbalancing was achieved by rotating the 4 different pages of test strings through serial position using a Latin Square design. This design resulted in four different test booklet/pages combinations across the 39 participants; 10 participants received format 1 (white-pages 1, 2; green-pages 3, 4), 11 received format 2 (white-pages 2, 3; greenpages 4, 1), 10 received format 3 (white-pages 3, 4; green-pages 1, 2) and 8 received format 4 (white-pages 4, 1; green-pages 2, 3). This design ensured that each page of strings occurred approximately equally often in each serial position across participants. All analyses were conducted on data collapsed across the different formats.
Procedure. The training procedure was the same as in Experiment 1. After the training Response bases of classification 19 phase was completed, each participant was provided with an envelope. Participants were asked to insert their training sheets into the envelope and remove the white booklet. The first page of the white booklet consisted of instructions which the experimenter read aloud as the participants followed along. The instructions informed participants that there were two different grammars used to generate the two lists they had just studied, but did not provide any details of their nature. The instructions also mentioned that the pages of the booklet contained an equal number of GA, GB and NG items. They were asked to insert either an "A" (for consistent with the rules of list A), a "B" (for consistent with the rules of list B), an "NC" (for not consistent with the rules of either list) or a "K" (for known to be consistent with the rules of either list A or list B,
but not sure about specific list membership) in the space provided next to each test string. As we believed the discrimination between the GA and GB items would be difficult, we instructed participants to only use the "K" response category as a second choice so that it wouldn't be overused. After rating both pages of strings, participants returned the white booklet to the envelope and returned them to the experimenter.
Twelve days after learning the two lists of strings, participants' envelopes were returned to them and they were asked to remove the green test booklet. The instructions on the first page were the same as those on the white test booklet completed 12 days earlier. Two novel pages of strings followed the instruction page (particular pages determined according to the counterbalance scheme described above). After completing the test booklets, participants inserted them back into the envelope and the envelopes were returned to the experimenter.
Results and Discussion
The mean assignment rates for GA, GB and NG items to the four different response categories ("list A," "list B," "not consistent" and "know") are shown in Table 3 . As in Experiment 1, the rates for GA and GB items are based on both old and new items pooled together. The first aspect of these data to note is the very low response rate for "know"
responses. Participants didn't use this category for more than 5% of the items in any condition.
This low response rate may be partly attributable to including the instruction to only use the "know" response category as a second choice. However, participants' disfavour of the "know"
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For the reader's convenience, the response rates for the in concert and opposition conditions, collapsed across the two different grammars, are shown in Table 4 . As explained above, these values were derived from the data presented in Table 3 . For example, the in concert acceptance rate is equal to the average of (a) the proportion of GA items assigned to "list A" and (b) the proportion of GB items assigned to "list B." Also presented in Table 4 are the baseline response rates, again collapsed across responses to the two different grammars (i.e., the proportion of NG items assigned to either "list A" or "list B"). As in Experiment 1, two main analyses were completed on the data summarized in Table 4 . The first analysis compared the acceptance rate of grammatical items in the in concert condition with the acceptance rate on the same items in the opposition condition to determine the extent to which participants could control their responding in the task. A 2 (retention interval: immediate/delay) X 2 (condition: in concert/opposition) within-subjects ANOVA revealed that the acceptance rate of grammatical items in the in concert condition (.44) was significantly greater than in the opposition condition In summary, the effect of imposing a retention interval in this experiment was analogous to the effect of implementing a response deadline at test in Experiment 1. In both experiments, controlled responding was impaired by the experimental manipulation, but automatic responding remained intact. Furthermore, this experiment yielded results comparable to those obtained in Experiment 1 despite the fact that we controlled for potential shifts in response bias between the in concert and opposition conditions and despite the fact that a completely different methodology was used to derive the in concert and in opposition conditions.
General Discussion
The main results of the two experiments reported in this paper were (1) participants showed evidence of controlled responding, but this responding was impaired by imposing a response deadline at test (Experiment 1) and by lengthening the retention interval (Experiment 2), and (2) participants demonstrated evidence of automatic responding, but unlike controlled responding, automatic responding was not affected by either response deadline at test (Experiment 1) or by lengthening the retention interval (Experiment 2). These results are consistent with other research demonstrating the operation of two separable influences in classification that can be considered analogous to the effects of familiarity and conscious recollection as they are theorized to operate in dual-process models of recognition memory (e.g., see Higham, 1997a; Higham & Vokey, 1994; Vokey & Brooks, 1992; Vokey & Higham, 1998) .
The finding that classification is not a pure measure of implicit processes indicates that the exclusiveness assumption, necessary for dissociation logic to work, is not met in research that uses classification as an indirect test of learning. As outlined in the Introduction, the Vokey and Higham (1998) found that the grammaticality effect was attenuated in transfer experiments in which the symbols used to construct strings were changed from training to test whereas the effect of specific trainingtest item similarity was not. This dissociative pattern was achieved both with consistent training to test letter changes and with item-specific changes in which a unique set of symbols were used to construct each test item. In the same vein, Higham (1997b) found that substituting vowels for consonants in a finite state structure attenuated the specific similarity effect but not the grammaticality effect. Although these dissociations reveal that unitary mechanism accounts of classification are insufficient, they do not indicate directly whether classification in experiments using a single structure is supported by explicit mechanisms (which would violate the exclusiveness criterion). However, Higham (1997a) , again using a single structure, found that dividing attention at test also dissociated specific similarity and grammaticality effects; specific similarity was reduced whereas grammaticality remained intact. As dividing attention at test is generally believed to selectively affect explicit processes (e.g., Jacoby, 1991), Higham suggested that this pattern was consistent with a dual-process model whereby the specific similarity effect was mostly attributable to false conscious retrieval, whereas the grammaticality effect was more based on automatic retrieval leading to a feeling of "rightness" (e.g., Whittlesea & Dorken, 1993 . Together, these results suggest that the exclusiveness criterion is violated in classification experiments using a single grammar as well as in those using two grammars. Dienes et al. (1995) also investigated the role of controlled processes in a series of Response bases of classification 23 artificial grammar experiments using two grammars and experimental conditions analogous to the in concert and opposition conditions used in this paper. They found evidence for controlled responding; for example, participants could successfully reject test items specifically from one grammar. However, contrary to the results obtained in Experiments 1 and 2 in this paper, they found no evidence for automatic responding. In fact, their opposition acceptance rates were numerically less than the nongrammatical acceptance rates in their Experiment 1.
We suspect the main source of the difference between the results of our study and those of Dienes et al. (1995) has to do with a different choice of nongrammatical items. Dienes et al. ensured that their nongrammatical items closely resembled the strings generated by the two different grammars. For example, they had each nongrammatical string begin with a legal bigram and terminate with a legal letter. We placed no such constraints on the nongrammatical strings in our experiments, except to ensure that the nongrammatical items were of the same approximate length (3-7 letters) and composed of the same set of five letters as the grammatical strings (M, X, V, R, T). Consequently, the overlap of features between the grammatical and nongrammatical items in our studies was not as great as in Dienes et al.'s research. This difference suggests that the automatic responding obtained in our research was at least partially based on participants' ability to reject items that are odd or unusual relative to grammatical items.
To test this hypothesis, we performed a post-hoc similarity analysis on the nongrammatical items and reanalyzed the data from Experiment 1. To do this, we first calculated the anchor position chunk frequency of the nongrammatical items. Previous research has indicated that the familiarity of test item bigrams and trigrams in the initial and terminal positions is an important measure of the degree to which a test item is similar to the training list as a whole (e.g., see Higham, 1997a Higham, , 1997b Knowlton & Squire, 1994; Meulemans & Van der Linden, 1997; Reber & Lewis, 1977; Redington & Chater, 1996) . This metric was This analysis revealed that 8 of our nongrammatical items began with a legal bigram and had average anchor position chunk frequencies of 1.0 or higher. These were labelled the undistinctive items and are marked with asterisks in Appendix B. The other 12 nongrammatical items began with an illegal bigram and had average anchor position chunk frequencies of 0.5 or lower. These were labelled the distinctive items. Analyses that tested for automatic effects in Experiment 1 were repeated, only they were performed separately for the distinctive and undistinctive NG items. The analysis using the distinctive items revealed evidence for automatic processing; GA items in the opposition condition were endorsed with higher probabillity (.51) than were distinctive NG items (.37), F(1,23)=8.99, MSE=.051. As before, this difference was unaffected by response deadline, F(1,23)<1. In contrast, however, the difference between the endorsement rate of GA items in opposition condition (.51) and the undistinctive NG items (.43) was not significant, F(1,23)=2.61, MSE=.058, p>.11. This latter result replicates that of Dienes et al. (1995) ; when the undistinctive NG items were compared to the opposition condition, no evidence for automatic processing was found.
This analysis suggests that finding evidence for automatic processing with opposition logic in an artificial grammar learning paradigm is somewhat dependent on the distinctiveness of the NG items. Some readers may argue that the rejection of highly unusual or distinctive NG items is a controlled, explicit decision rather than automatic decision because it is easy to identify the feature or features that render the item unacceptable. However, effortless rejection and/or the ability to cite rules or name features of NG items that make them unacceptable is not evidence against the automatic nature of the effect we are describing. To assume that it is Response bases of classification 25 confuses opposition logic with dissociation logic.
Consider, for example, an extremely effortless form of the task in which all NG items begin with "N" and participants are told that this is the case. In all likelihood, the rejection of NG items would be effortless under these circumstances and the vast majority of participants would be able to explicitly state the feature "N" as the rejection basis. By dissociation logic, rejection of NG items is explicit; all classification performance can be predicted by the test of awareness, leaving no residual effect to attribute to automatic processing. However, more information is needed to determine whether or not an automatic effect via opposition logic has been obtained.
Suppose, for example, that all GA items (which should be accepted in the in concert condition and rejected in opposition) begin with the letter "A." It is likely that these items would also be easily rejected in the opposition condition and the basis for this rejection could also be explicitly stated. Because all GA items in opposition would be rejected, no evidence for automatic processing via opposition logic would be obtained (i.e., endorsement rates: opposition=baseline=0.0). Conversely, if GA items are accepted with greater likelihood than NG items, then there would be evidence for automatic processing.
The point is that evidence for automatic processing in opposition logic is dependent on obtaining a residual difference between the opposition and baseline conditions, not on participants' reports regarding the bases of their performance. According to opposition logic, if this residual difference is found, there must have been an effect on performance that participants could not discount despite instructions to do so, and as such, the effect reflects automatic processing. In our experiments, further support for the automatic nature of this processing was derived from the finding that the size of the opposition-baseline difference was unaffected by retrieval-time manipulations (response deadline and extended retention interval).
Both of these manipulations were expected to (and did) affect controlled processing, but were not expected to (and did not) affect automatic processing. Whether or not participants could explicitly state the feature or features that were the bases of particular decisions is irrelevant; it was not even necessary to interview participants to determine whether these rules were known.
We avoided gathering evidence of this sort because it lies in the realm of dissociation logic and
Response bases of classification 26 is subject to all the problems outlined in the introduction to this paper. To assume that the ability to name features that form the basis of rejection somehow means that the automatic effect we have reported is actually explicit gives special status to verbal report as the ultimate measure of automaticity, a status that is not justified in opposition logic.
The finding that the automatic effect demonstrated in our experiments is dependent on the distinctiveness of the NG items raises a second concern. Using distinctive test item features to reject NG items is clearly under the person's control, so it seems paradoxical to claim that such controlled behavior has effects that we refer to as automatic. However, it is important to emphasize that it is the influences on behavior, not the behavior itself, that we consider to be automatic. It is possible that participants intentionally applied a simple rule to 100 per cent of the test items in our experiments. But clearly that rule did not sort opposition and baseline items from in concert items equally well, otherwise an opposition-baseline difference would not have been obtained. Therefore, although the application of the rule may have been fully under participants' control, given that an opposition-baseline difference was obtained, there were influences on behavior that could not have been fully under control. Thus, those influences, by definition, were unintended or automatic. Higham and Brooks (1997) also found evidence of a rejection mechanism underlying classification. However, their materials were words rather than consonant strings. This difference in materials may be important because pre-experimental familiarity (or lack thereof) was probably the basis of this rejection in Higham and Brooks' research, rather than familiarity based on comparison to items learned in training, as in the present research. To illustrate the difference, consider Higham and Brooks' second experiment. Participants were asked to memorize a long word list and then were informed after the training phase that the training list was structured, but were not informed of the nature of the structure. In the test phase, participants were asked to discriminate test items as either belonging to the structure or not.
The researchers found that if items were old, high distinctive items (e.g., rare or unusual words)
were more likely to be accepted in a classification task than low distinctive items (e.g., common words). However, the opposite was true if the items were new; that is, high distinctive items
Response bases of classification 27 were less likely to be accepted than low distinctive words. Note that this mirror effect (Glanzer & Bowles, 1976) was based on the pre-experimental distinctiveness of the items, not distinctiveness relative to training phase items. Nonetheless, whether participants use trainingbased knowledge or pre-experimental knowledge, it is clear that some form of metacognitive mechanism is necessary to explain these effects (i.e., the participant must be reasoning something like "that item is not like anything I saw in training; if it had been, I would have remembered it"). These results again highlight the insufficiency of unitary mechanism accounts of classification performance. Higham and Brooks (1997) did not attempt to isolate the mechanism or mechanisms producing the mirror effect from other potential mechanisms of classification, but the current research suggests that item rejection and presumably the mirror effect can occur automatically.
Similarly, some recognition memory researchers have found that the mirror effect in their research is not affected by demands on attention, suggesting that it is not supported by a memorability judgment that is conscious and deliberate (e.g., Hintzman, Caulton & Curran, 1994) . The automatic nature of the rejection mechanism described in this paper concurs with this general conclusion from recognition memory.
Metaknowledge, Latent Knowledge and Consciousness Dienes and Berry (1997a) have recently argued that it might be fruitful to characterize implicit learning as learning that occurs in the absence of metaknowledge; that is, implicit learning is learning that occurs below a subjective threshold (Cheesman & Merikle, 1984) .
These authors suggested that the subjective threshold in implicit learning research could be defined according to either a guessing criterion (Dienes et al., 1995) or a zero correlation criterion (Chan, 1992 , as cited in Dienes et al., 1995 . To meet the former criterion, a person must demonstrate above chance classification performance, but claim to be only guessing. To meet the latter criterion, it is necessary to demonstrate that the correlation between confidence and accuracy is zero.
We question, however, whether such an approach will be as fruitful as Dienes and Berry (1997a) claim. First, the guessing criterion is based on dissociation logic; that is, unconscious the application of knowledge in the face of no metaknowledge indicates that accurate knowledge must have been applied without awareness. However, because it is so difficult to meet the exclusiveness, information and sensitivity criteria, it is unlikely that skeptics of unconscious processes will be convinced by experiments based on this logic. Concern over some of these problems can be lessened if qualitative differences are obtained between learning above versus below the subjective threshold (e.g. see Cheesman & Merikle, 1986 ), but even so, enough problems have become apparent with research based on this logic over the years to consider abandoning it altogether.
We believe that the zero correlation criterion is also going to prove difficult or impossible to meet because, like dissociation logic, the emphasis is on proving the absence or lack of something. For example, consider research by Chan (1992, as cited in Dienes et al., 1995) that used this criterion. He found that the correlation between confidence and accuracy for participants trained incidentally was a nonsignificant .20. Based on this evidence, Dienes et al. argued that these data show that "incidentally trained participants lacked metaknowledge about their knowledge" (pg. 1324). However, a skeptic of the claim that knowledge can exist in the absence of metaknowledge is in a position to argue that the test of metaknowledge was not sensitive enough, and had a better test been used, a significant correlation might have been found. The point is that the emphasis with the zero correlation criterion is on proving null awareness, a strategy that is almost certainly not going to convince skeptics of unconscious learning (e.g., see Merikle, 1994) .
A somewhat different perspective on metaknowledge that might avoid these issues is suggested by considering the automatic rejection of nongrammatical items demonstrated in the current experiments. Suppose this idea is taken to an extreme and a person is asked to classify the test items "IBM," "XXXXX" or "MADONNA" as either consistent or inconsistent with the training sets used in Experiments 1 and 2. It is certain that the person would accurately and
Response bases of classification 29 confidently reject all of them. But is it reasonable to assume that this performance was based on pre-computed rules corresponding to no acronyms, no single letter strings, and no popularsingers in the training list and that these rules were held in consciousness before being tested?
To suggest that this knowledge was pre-computed is also to suggest that rules for every other dimension of nongrammaticality that might have been tested were also pre-computed. Such a proposition is, of course, absurd as such precomputation would require a virtually infinite conscious knowledge base at any given time. Stated simply, there are too many different dimensions which can be used to discriminate grammatical from nongrammatical items to suppose that all such dimensions are precomputed and held in consciousness prior to the test (see Vokey & Brooks, 1994 , Vokey & Higham, 1998 and Wright & Burton, 1995 for further discussion).
In considering knowledge in this negative sense -knowing what something is not -we believe that it is quite sensible to describe a great deal of the knowledge base that participants have after exposure to the training set as unconscious in the sense that it is latent. That is, after learning the training items, participants have the potential to make inferences and decisions based on memory for the items, but prior to the requirement to calculate the knowledge (e.g., "is XVT consistent or inconsistent with the rules?"), it cannot sensibly be described as conscious. Once the inference is made (e.g., XVT is rejected), the dimension of the rejection may be fully available to consciousness (e.g., "there were no items beginning with an X"). However, we suspect that awareness of the rules in such cases is more of a bi-product of the inferential process than a determinant of it. Presumably, exactly what aspect or aspects of what was learned become explicit and conscious will depend on what is asked or required of the person at test, and more generally, the circumstances of retrieval (e.g., Vokey & Brooks, 1992; Whittlesea & Dorken, 1993) .
Episodes versus Abstraction
The fact that the person must be able to reject so many different types of nongrammatical items, on line and automatically, suggests that a great deal of episodic information must be retained from the training experience. Supporters of pure abstraction
Response bases of classification 30 might argue that only abstract rule-like information is available in memory at test. However, it is unlikely that such rules would provide a rich enough knowledge base to account for all the dimensions on which nongrammatical items might be rejected.
The on-line computation framework we are describing is conceptually compatible with a number of different episodic memory models that have been proposed recently in which computations (e.g., inferences and attributions), based on recruited episodes, are performed at the time of retrieval. Such models have been forwarded to explain typicality effects for ad-hoc categories (e.g., Barsalou, 1983 Barsalou, , 1987 , general knowledge and schema-driven behaviour (e.g., Hintzman, 1988; Whittlesea, 1987) , norms and expectations (Kahneman & Miller, 1986) , attributional phenomena (e.g., Jacoby, Kelley & Dywan, 1989; Whittlesea, 1993) and implicit learning (e.g., Brooks, 1978; Brooks & Vokey, 1991; Vokey & Brooks, 1992 , 1994 Vokey & Higham, 1998; Whittlesea & Dorken, 1993 Whittlesea & Wright, 1997) . The major advantage of such models is that they can explain the surprising amount of knowledge people sometimes demonstrate from very limited training. Additionally, episodic models can account for encoding specificity effects (Tulving & Thomson, 1973) in classification (e.g., Vokey & Brooks, 1992; Whittlesea & Dorken, 1993) and other effects produced by varying the circumstances of retrieval (e.g., Higham, 1997b) . Some of these findings pose serious problems for models based on abstraction.
Conclusion
In summary, the two experiments reported in this paper lead to very similar conclusions:
both response deadline and test delay impaired the application of knowledge which was controllable by the participant, but these variables had no effect on the automatic component to responding. Furthermore, the comparison of our results with those of Dienes et al. (1995) indicated that we need to consider both the mechanisms underlying rejection of nongrammatical items as well as the mechanisms of acceptance. Considering this negative side to classification also shed some light on the nature of potential metacognitive mechanisms involved with classification and the extent to which the knowledge acquired is distributed. Gomez, 1997) . This research, conducted by Dienes, Altmann, Kwan and Goode (1995) , will be discussed in more detail in the General Discussion.
2. There are some exceptions to this general rule. Higham (1997a) was able to investigate implicit and explicit bases of classification by examining effects within a particular task, rather than comparing performance across tasks. For example, he found that the specific item similarity effect and the grammaticality effect in the same classification task could be dissociated with certain experimental manipulations, providing insight into potential implicit and explicit supporting mechanisms.
3. Although responses of "know" could legitimately be included in our tests of controlled and automatic processing, the rate of such responses was so low that this response category was excluded from the analyses.
Response bases of classification 43 Note. In concert=the likelihood of rating GA items "grammatical" given instructions to rate both GA and GB items as "grammatical"; opposition=the likelihood of rating GA items "grammatical"
given instructions to only rate GB items as "grammatical"; baseline=the likelihood of rating NG items "grammatical" given instructions to only rate GB items "grammatical." See text for more detail.
Response bases of classification 45 Table 3 Rates and 2. Grammar A was taken from Vokey and Brooks (1992) . Letters and arrows within Grammar A were altered to create Grammar B.
